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INTRODUCTION 
Are we beginning a new age of localism?  Between the “Brexit” 
vote, the city-rural divide exposed by the American presidential 
election, and, more positively, the New Urban Agenda agreed to the 
United Nations Habitat III conference in Quito, evidence abounds 
that we are moving into a period that values local over global, the 
specific over the general.1  It is a propitious moment for the 
publication of Richard Schragger’s excellent book, City Power: Urban 
Governance in a Global Age.2  This book is a reminder that nations 
and their economies, social systems, and cultures, are primarily 
conglomerations of local economies, social systems, and cultures.  
This has been true for centuries, and was particularly true in the 
United States, as Schragger points out, in its periods of greatest 
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 1. See Emily Badger et al., The Election Highlighted a Growing Rural-Urban 
Split, N.Y. TIMES: THEUPSHOT (Nov. 11, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/
12/upshot/this-election-highlighted-a-growing-rural-urban-split.html [https://nyti.ms/
2jNUu50] (analyzing the outcome of the 2016 American presidential election); 
Rachel Donadio, Britain’s Flight Signals End of an Era of Transnational Optimism, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/25/world/europe/
brexit-britain-european-union.html [https://nyti.ms/2lAvEUs] (discussing the 
“Brexit” vote); Michael Kimmelman, Opinion, The Kind of Thinking Cities Need, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/30/opinion/sunday/the-
kind-of-thinking-cities-need.html [https://nyti.ms/2jLTI5N] (noting the positive 
outcomes of Habitat III). 
 2. RICHARD SCHRAGGER, CITY POWER: URBAN GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBAL 
AGE (2016). 
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dynamism.3  The city, he argues with much evidence, created 
America.  And since cities are at the front of creativity, economic 
growth, and cultural development, they deserve respect in our 
governmental system.  As Schragger ably demonstrates, respect for 
local decision-making is the proper foundation of our federal system.4  
Moreover, as Schragger argues, the law should organize itself around 
supporting the power of citizens to govern themselves at the local 
level.5 
I.  RETHINKING CITY POWER 
City Power is a major contribution to the literature about the 
history, current scope, and future prospects of urban economic, 
political, and social power in the United States.  Schragger makes a 
strong argument for an expansive view of the role of cities and the 
power they should have.  This Review assesses Schragger’s major and 
most innovative arguments about local power in the United States, 
and uses Schragger’s arguments to propose ways to go beyond 
“unleashing” local government by creating legal structures that 
prioritize and exploit the strengths of localism to build a better 
society.  The current political climate, both nationally and globally, 
makes this an ideal moment to set up sustainable local government 
structures—structures that would contribute to the global debate over 
the role of the city in society. 
City Power addresses two deeply connected issues: first, whether 
cities can govern themselves, and second, whether cities should be 
allowed to govern themselves.  Schragger answers yes to both.6  Cities 
have the power to shape their economies and social systems, and they 
should use this power to improve life for their citizens.  As Schragger 
says this book is “really about the relationship of local economy and 
legal institutions.”7  Cities, Schragger argues, shape economic growth 
and are shaped by it.  Cities have shown themselves, through boom 
and bust, to be creative responders to the challenges facing their 
residents.  With greater freedom, Schragger argues, cities can develop 
innovative solutions to the challenges of poverty, sustainability, and 
other social problems.8 
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Yet cities have been limited in their abilities to respond to these 
challenges.  These limits are both legal and conceptual.  State and 
federal laws restrict the authority of cities to provide services, 
regulate markets, and engage in policy innovation.9  Even more 
restrictive than these legal limitations is the view during the past half 
century that what cities should do to respond to urban challenges 
extends only to their role as competitors for “consumer-citizens” 
whose only concerns are the bundle of goods that they, as cities, can 
offer.10  Schragger argues this competitive city model has narrowed 
what is possible in our cities, and people need to open their minds to 
alternative approaches: 
My own conception of the city is grounded in its public role: the city 
as a site for individual and collective economic and political 
development.  Like all cities, that city is an abstraction.  
Municipalities have political boundaries, but cities have sociological, 
economic, and spatial ones too—and municipal boundaries do not 
usually capture those.11 
This broader understanding of the role of the city allows for the 
possibility of more comprehensive government interventions that will 
enable cities and their residents to flourish. 
Chief among its many contributions, City Power successfully 
weakens the argument that economic competition must direct local 
decision-making.  For more than sixty years, the Tiebout Hypothesis 
has hung over urban policy like the Sword of Damocles.12  In his 
famous work, Tiebout theorized that, in a market society with free 
mobility, cities must view themselves solely in economic terms and 
sell themselves to prospective inhabitants.  Residents, Tiebout 
hypothesized, each have a distinct preference pattern for public goods 
and select their community based on the optimal satisfaction of those 
preferences.13  Correspondingly, he argued that successful cities are 
                                                                                                                 
 9. See generally SCHRAGGER, supra note 2, at 78–132 (discussing the effects of 
“Vertical Federalism” and “Horizontal Federalism” in chapters three and four, 
respectively). 
 10. See id. at 44–45. 
 11. Id. at 15. 
 12. See SCHRAGGER, supra note 2, at 31–32. See generally Charles M. Tiebout, A 
Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956).  For further 
discussion on the impact of Tiebout’s model, see generally THE TIEBOUT MODEL AT 
FIFTY: ESSAYS IN PUBLIC ECONOMICS IN HONOR OF WALLACE OATES (William A. 
Fischel ed., 2006). 
 13. See Tiebout, supra note 12, at 418. 
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those that best match the public goods they provide to the demands 
of consumers.14 
Though Tiebout noted several possible bundles of public goods 
that might attract consumer-citizens,15 the Tiebout framework has 
come to be accepted as defining a model of city governance that 
prioritizes economic development over other values.16  Further, 
proponents of this framework have argued that promoting economic 
development means very specific types of policies, in particular, low 
taxes that attract investment and wealthy people that will pay for 
basic services.17  Finally, the accepted wisdom holds that service costs 
must be strictly limited, or consumer-citizens will move to more 
“attractive” communities.18 
Tiebout was honest that this was a theory, one that needed to be 
backed up by research, data, and evidence.19  However, even without 
much evidence to support it, this framework soon came to dominate 
urban policy at local and even national levels.20  If the data ever 
supported this thesis, it certainly does not support the Tiebout 
framework in twenty-first-century America.  Schragger shows, in 
detail, how the last two decades of urban growth undermine, if not 
obliterate, this theory.21  If the theory were true, Schragger argues, 
shouldn’t cities with low taxes and service provisions have the highest 
economic growth?  Not only is this not the case, but some of the cities 
with the highest taxes and service budgets (New York being the most 
striking, but far from the only example) are exactly the places with 
                                                                                                                 
 14. See id. at 417, 420. 
 15. See Tiebout, supra note 12, at 418 (noting that consumers may prefer a 
community with higher taxes and more services).  For further discussion of the “high 
tax-high service” model of local government in which citizens pay high taxes but 
receive significant services in return, see NEIL R. PEIRCE, THE GREAT PLAINS STATES 
OF AMERICA: PEOPLE, POLITICS, AND POWER IN THE NINE GREAT PLAINS STATES 140 
(1973) (discussing Minnesota’s high-tax high service system). 
 16. See SCHRAGGER, supra note 2, at 45–46, 214. 
 17. See, e.g., James Buchanan, Principles of Urban Fiscal Strategy, 11 PUB. 
CHOICE 1, 13 (1971). 
 18. See id. at 14–15. 
 19. See Tiebout, supra note 12, at 417, 423–24. See generally THE TIEBOUT 
MODEL AT FIFTY, supra note 12. 
 20. See Wallace E. Oates, An Essay on Fiscal Federalism, 37 J. ECON. 
LITERATURE 1120, 1124 (1999); see also Darien Shanske, Above All Else Stop 
Digging: Local Government Law as a (Partial) Cause of (and Solution to) the 
Current Housing Crisis, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 663, 663–64, 672 (2010) 
(demonstrating the effect of the Tiebout model on local housing policy). 
 21. SCHRAGGER, supra note 2, at 45–46. 
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the highest economic growth.22  Conversely, places like Detroit, which 
has adopted some of the most “investment attractive” policies in the 
country at the local and state levels (for example, eliminating taxes 
for most economic development and providing public subsidies to 
boot) while slashing services, have among the slowest economic 
growth.23 
Schragger does not just make the point that the arguments for 
economic development-led urban policies are weak; he goes further 
by arguing that it is impossible to draw conclusions about why some 
cities prosper economically while others struggle.24  There is no 
definitive explanation for what caused the bay area to flourish; 
though one might point to the tech boom, why did the tech boom 
happen there and not in Omaha?  The answer does not lie in the 
economic policies of San Jose, which few people have described as a 
national model for urban innovation.  Since history and current 
experience do not support strong connections between local 
economic development policies and local economic growth, Schragger 
argues, a competitive regulatory structure does not explain city 
growth, and therefore, is not required to promote the interests of 
cities.25  Economic policy often fails.  Cities cannot guess the future.  
Cities can however, prepare their people and distribute wealth to 
promote greater equity.26 
Yet legal institutions, particularly at the state but also at the federal 
level, limit the power of cities to pursue goals other than economic 
development.  City Power is rich in urban history and presents a 
wonderful example of how historical perspective can helpfully frame 
solutions to current challenges.  The existing framework, which 
greatly limits the power of local governments to collect revenue, 
provide services, and develop productive urban policies, emerged out 
of a very specific context: the urban revolution of the late 1800s.27  
                                                                                                                 
 22. See SCHRAGGER, supra note 2, at 48–51.  For more on city taxes and services, 
see Thomas Frohlich & Alexander Hess, Top Ten Cities with the Highest Tax Rates, 
USA TODAY (Feb. 16, 2014), https://www.usatoday.com/
story/money/personalfinance/2014/02/16/top-10-cities-with-highest-tax-rates/5513981/ 
[https://perma.cc/6DAQ-DHN2]. 
 23. Matthew Dolan & Kathleen Gray, Study: Michigan Outpaces Other States on 
Tax Breaks, Incentives for Businesses, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Mar. 7, 2017), 
http://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2017/03/07/study-michigan-outpaces-
neighboring-states-business-incentives/98816516/ [https://perma.cc/KV5U-RMLU]. 
 24. See SCHRAGGER, supra note 2, at 46. 
 25. Id. 
 26. See generally SCHRAGGER, supra note 2 (discussing methods of redistribution 
via policy and politics in chapters five and six, respectively). 
 27. Id. at 65–69. 
1454 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLIV 
The rapid growth of cities in this era created massive fortunes, even 
larger social upheaval, and dramatic governance challenges.28  Cities 
attempted to respond to these challenges in numerous and creative 
ways, often drawing on their past history of public-private 
partnerships.29  The relationship between government and private 
enterprise, which was always fraught, became a significant concern to 
political reformers, who sought to control the influence of money in 
local government by limiting its power.  As Schragger says: 
In the U.S., the scope of the city’s legal authority and the division of 
authority between cities, states, and the federal government—what 
constitutional theorists call federalism—are best understood as a 
reaction to the political pathologies that arise from the city-business 
relationship.  Those pathologies reflect our political ambivalence 
about the inevitable intermixing of public and private power.  Local 
political power has often been viewed as corrupt, understood 
broadly as the use of public monies for private ends.  Even as the 
public subsidization of private activity has become commonplace, we 
have not resolved our nagging concerns about this intermixing.30 
As a result, state laws restrict the power of local governments to, 
among other things: tax new forms of income, discriminate in favor of 
their residents, or develop services that compete with state 
governments (or the private sector).31  These limitations on power 
have been critiqued by many policymakers and academics, but 
Supreme Court jurisprudence, most notably in Hunter v. City of 
Pittsburgh, makes clear that cities are “mere convenient agencies for 
exercising such of the governmental powers of the state as may be 
entrusted to them.”32  Cities, the law holds, are restricted in their 
authority for the good of their residents and of society. 
Schragger’s historical analysis is sound, but I would amplify and 
extend one important point.  Limitations on city power arose in a 
specific context: concern about concentrations of power and the 
                                                                                                                 
 28. For thorough discussion on the rise of the city, see generally ROBERT M. 
FOGELSON, DOWNTOWN: ITS RISE AND FALL, 1880–1950 (2001). 
 29. For more on the nineteenth-century city, see generally ERNEST S. GRIFFITH, A 
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CITY: THE CONSPICUOUS FAILURE, 1870–1900 (1974); 
IRA KATZNELSON, CITY TRENCHES: URBAN POLITICS AND THE PATTERNING OF CLASS 
IN THE UNITED STATES (1981); JON C. TEAFORD, THE UNHERALDED TRIUMPH: CITY 
GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA, 1870–1900 (1984); James C. Scott, Corruption, Machine 
Politics, and Political Change, 63 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1142 (1969). 
 30. SCHRAGGER, supra note 2, at 8. 
 31. See generally GERALD E. FRUG & DAVID J. BARRON, CITY BOUND: HOW 
STATES STIFLE URBAN INNOVATION (2008). 
 32. 207 U.S. 161, 178–79 (1907). 
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influence of corruption with the rise of the “political machine.”33  
While many concerns motivated government “reformers,” high 
among them was the power that political machines gave to recent 
immigrants, people viewed by native-born Americans as less 
“worthy.”  Like most if not all political battles, the fight between the 
“machine” and the “reformers” was one for power between 
newcomers and old-timers.34  While couched in moral terms as a fight 
for good government, in the end it was about who got to make the 
decisions.  Dillon’s Rule (which limits city powers to those explicitly 
delegated by the state) and other efforts to limit city authority were 
about restricting the ability of immigrants to reshape cities in their 
own image.  State limits on local government power to borrow 
money, to establish business operations, and to provide services to 
their constituents, were all efforts to limit the scope and impact of 
local governments exactly at the time that immigrants were taking 
control of those governments.35  In the twentieth century, as African-
Americans, Latinos, and other persons of color have gained greater 
influence over local governments, cities continue to be chastised as 
“ungovernable” and inherently corrupt.36  To be certain, American 
history and current events abound with stories of inefficiency, 
unethical activity, and outright crime at the local level, but cities 
continue to govern themselves and often flourish even with limited 
resources and under strong legal constraints.37  In the end, the 
question of city power is not one of efficiency, Schragger argues.  It is 
about whether citizens in a democracy have the right to govern 
themselves. 
Further, in the 1800s, city power was the only meaningful power.  
State governments were far from the robust entities they are today.  
Today, states are active in health care, environmental protection, 
education, and criminal justice, among other functions, but in the 
                                                                                                                 
 33. See generally LINCOLN STEFFENS, THE SHAME OF THE CITIES (Hill & Wang 
1987) (1904); TEAFORD, supra note 29. 
 34. See generally DENNIS R. JUDD & PAUL P. KANTOR, THE POLITICS OF URBAN 
AMERICA: A READER (2d ed. 1998); DENNIS R. JUDD & TODD SWANSTROM, CITY 
POLITICS: PRIVATE POWER AND PUBLIC POLICY (1st ed. 1994); KATZNELSON, supra 
note 29. 
 35. See JUDD & SWANSTROM, supra note 34, at 47–49. 
 36. See generally VINCENT CANNATO, THE UNGOVERNABLE CITY: JOHN LINDSAY 
AND HIS STRUGGLE TO SAVE NEW YORK (2001); FRED SIEGEL, THE FUTURE ONCE 
HAPPENED HERE: NEW YORK, D.C., L.A. AND THE FATE OF AMERICA’S BIG CITIES 
(2000). 
 37. See generally EDWARD GLAESER, THE TRIUMPH OF THE CITY: HOW OUR 
GREATEST INVENTION MAKES US RICHER, SMARTER, GREENER, HEALTHIER, AND 
HAPPIER (2012). 
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1800s, most states provided only basic ministerial functions.38  And 
the federal government was even weaker than state governments.  
Concern about local power from state and federal officials might be 
better seen as “jealousy” of local capacity and desire to assume it.  
With the emergence of state governments in the Progressive Era, 
followed by the federal government during the New Deal and 
thereafter, federalism today looks very different than it did when 
local limitations were developed.39  In the 1800s, cities dominated the 
debate about what government should do.40  That is no longer the 
case, but maybe the balance of power should start to move back in 
that direction. 
A century of experience shows that neither state nor federal 
centralization can erase concerns over the power of money in political 
decision-making.  As Clayton Gillette long ago argued, claims that 
state governments can provide protection against capture are based 
on hunches, not data.41  Nor have state governments or the federal 
government been immune to corruption or discriminatory decision-
making.  Given Washington’s current dysfunction and Americans’ 
lack of faith in federal institutions, a move back towards more 
localized decision-making seems attractive to people from across the 
political spectrum. 
II.  UNLEASHING THE CITY 
City Power has many strengths.  First, it not only synthesizes many 
aspects of Schragger’s prior work on local government as well as the 
work of other scholars, it knits these earlier pieces together into a 
coherent thesis clearly tied to both evidence and conclusions.  Unlike 
some other books in legal academia, City Power is not a cobbling 
together of articles.  It is a comprehensive and well-structured book.  
Second, the book’s use of historical sources is both thorough and 
innovative.  It is an excellent introduction to urban history, and also 
puts that history in important context to help explain the current 
structures of local government.  Third, the book provides an excellent 
                                                                                                                 
 38. See generally MICHAEL MCGERR, A FIERCE DISCONTENT: THE RISE AND 
FALL OF THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT (2005). 
 39. For further discussion on the New Deal state, see IRA KATZNELSON, FEAR 
ITSELF: THE NEW DEAL AND THE ORIGINS OF OUR TIME (2014), and see also PHILIP 
FUNIGIELLO, THE CHALLENGE TO URBAN LIBERALISM: FEDERAL-CITY RELATIONS 
DURING WORLD WAR II (1978). 
 40. See generally KATZNELSON, supra note 29; JUDD & SWANSTROM, supra note 
34. 
 41. See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, The Exercise of Trumps by Decentralized 
Governments, 83 VA. L. REV. 1347, 1402–07, 1409–10 (1997). 
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antidote to the powerful (but declining) economic development 
framework, and helps chart a path forward for cities that enables 
them to truly serve the needs of their citizens.  Building on his 
historical and current analysis, Schragger offers an alternative 
framework for thinking both about what cities should do, and how 
local power could be structured to promote those goals. 
With limited reason to quibble with this excellent book, the rest of 
this response will focus on further explicating its implications for city 
governance.  Schragger asks two questions: can cities govern?  And, 
should cities govern?  He correctly answers affirmatively to both.  
However, having answered these in the affirmative, it is also 
important to ask: what should cities govern?  And, how should cities 
govern?  The answer to the first question requires further exploration 
of Schragger’s “alternative” approaches to governance to replace 
economic development as the dominant framework.  The answer to 
the second requires understanding what City Power as a legal matter 
might look like. 
Schragger puts forth social welfare spending as an alternative focus 
for cities, arguing that recent local innovations such as city living wage 
laws and environmental regulations point the way to an alternative 
approach.42  Later, Schragger says, “[c]ities should do less of what 
they cannot do—induce economic growth through competitive local 
industrial policies—and more of what they can—provide quality basic 
services to their residents.”43  Here, he puts a stake in the ground on 
the side of many progressive activists who have critiqued the 
economic development approach and called for investments in 
infrastructure, education, and other programs that help city 
residents.44 
So far, efforts to develop a progressive city theory have been 
limited.  Many can agree on what spending they do not like.  
However, it is much less clear which activities local governments 
should promote.  The typical answer to the question of progressive 
policy is that cities should spend on services to help the poor—
particularly education, which most people agree can help alleviate 
poverty and improve the life outcomes of young people.45  But even 
within the education sphere, there are deep debates about how to do 
                                                                                                                 
 42. SCHRAGGER, supra note 2, at 12, 16–17. 
 43. Id. at 248. 
 44. For further discussion on these calls for investment, see generally SUSAN S. 
FAINSTEIN, THE JUST CITY (2011); David Harvey, The Right to the City, 53 NEW 
LEFT REV. 23 (2008). 
 45. See generally FAINSTEIN, supra note 44; Harvey, supra note 44. 
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this.  Are charter schools the necessary innovation, or should 
traditional school systems, which have historically been unresponsive 
to many constituencies, be rebuilt?46  Should neighborhoods have the 
power to shape themselves, or does the “Not in My Backyard” 
attitude have too great an effect on the affordable housing shortages 
that many cities face?47  These are among the dozens of fundamental 
questions cities are currently debating, and the lines don’t fall clearly 
along the liberal-conservative axis.  Minimum wage and 
environmental regulations are good opening strategies towards a 
progressive city, but they are limited if the goal is to transform 
struggling local communities. 
Another suggestion that Schragger makes is a move away from 
global, large-scale capital to more support for more localized, small-
scale capital enterprises.48  Cities have attempted to implement 
policies to support local businesses for decades.  Some of these efforts 
have been successful, though the research on the impact of such 
programs has reached limited conclusions.49  And many of these 
efforts have been subject to similar criticisms—political capture, 
favoring of (local) elites and corruption—that Schragger discusses in 
his history of local government and the rise of state regulation.50  
Although local business can provide some inoculation against capital 
flight, the evidence of the success of such efforts is limited.51  Further, 
in earlier eras, most economic activity was, indeed, local, but activists 
such as union leaders, civil rights advocates, and others had problems 
with successful local businesses too.52  While global capital presents a 
particular set of problems, the underlying conflict will continue to be 
                                                                                                                 
 46. For an overview of the debate on charter schools, see KEEPING THE PROMISE?: 
THE DEBATE OVER CHARTER SCHOOLS (Leigh Dingerson et al. eds., 2008). 
 47. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David Schleicher, Planning an Affordable City, 
91 IOWA L. REV. 101, 115–16 (2015); see also Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David N. 
Schleicher, Balancing the “Zoning Budget,” 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 81, 97–99 
(2011). 
 48. SCHRAGGER, supra note 2, at 189. 
 49. For a snapshot highlighting some of this research, see Stacy Mitchell, Key 
Studies: Why Local Matters, INST. FOR LOC. SELF-RELIANCE (Dec. 22, 2011), 
https://ilsr.org/key-studies-why-local-matters/#1 [https://perma.cc/JF6B-C26A]. 
 50. See, e.g., Patrick Kerkstra, Sham Minority Contractors Have Been Hired in 
Your City, Probably, NEXT CITY (May 13, 2013), https://nextcity.org/daily/entry/
sham-minority-contractors-have-been-hired-in-your-city-probably [https://perma.cc/
F9GD-SUHU]. 
 51. See generally, Mitchell, supra note 49. 
 52. See, e.g., Richard C. Schragger, The Anti-Chain Store Movement, Localist 
Ideology, and the Remnants of the Progressive Constitution, 1920-1940, 90 IOWA L. 
REV. 1011, 1044–46 (2005) (highlighting complaints about local monopolies). 
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between the haves and have-nots, whether the haves are down the 
street or in London or Beijing. 
Another, perhaps fledgling, approach might be to adopt some of 
the strategies of the “sharing” movement, which acknowledges the 
power in collective, less capital-intensive operations where people 
contribute their own human capital and participate in the enjoyment 
of the resources produced by such communal activities.53  In recent 
years, such an approach has received increasing attention, but it 
remains a work in progress with many limitations.  For example, a 
framework that describes companies such as Uber and Airbnb, which 
have billions of dollars of capitalizations, as the foundation for a 
“sharing” system has significant challenges in application.54  These 
challenges underscore that, while many agree that the existing 
economic development framework should be scrapped, it is less clear 
what should replace it. 
Perhaps the second question is easier to answer: how should cities 
govern?  Schragger argues for “unchaining” local governments to 
allow them to experiment, but experiment within what framework?  
The only way to truly free cities for experimentation is to severely 
limit the ability of state and federal governments to regulate their 
activities.  One way to think about this might be to adopt “Super 
Home Rule” statutes that provide cities with wide areas of authority 
and couple those rules with judicial frameworks that require the state 
to prove that a city activity is clearly outside the bounds of this 
authority.55 
Much recent study has concluded that, like the late nineteenth 
century, American cities are the hubs of innovation and the places 
where most economic development is happening.  According to a 
recent Brookings report, more than sixty percent of job growth since 
the great recession is in urban areas, and the nation’s twenty largest 
metros constitute more than two thirds of the country’s productivity.56  
                                                                                                                 
 53. See DUNCAN MCCLAREN & JULIAN AGYEMAN, SHARING CITIES: A CASE FOR 
TRULY SMART AND SUSTAINABLE CITIES 4–8 (2015). 
 54. See, e.g., Naomi Schoenbaum, Gender and the Sharing Economy, 
43 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1023, 1024 (2016); Dean Baker, Don’t Buy the ‘Sharing 
Economy’ Hype, THE GUARDIAN (May 27, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2014/may/27/airbnb-uber-taxes-regulation [https://perma.cc/4KWK-
TWRT]. 
 55. See generally David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 
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Such dominance is a double-edged sword, as evidenced in the recent 
presidential election, where the “economically disenfranchised” part 
of the country voted overwhelming against the candidate supported 
by large cities.  However, if cities and metropolitan regions are the 
locus of growth, then cities should be empowered so that they can do 
more to distribute their wealth more widely and enable more people 
to participate in economic and social progress. 
Such a system would support greater local innovation, but it might 
frame that support specifically around the goal of greater economic 
and social inclusion.  It might require successful cities to partner with 
struggling satellite cities in their ambit and to assist those 
communities to enjoy the advantages of city growth.  It might couple 
greater local power to generate revenues (both through taxation and 
innovation) with current trends to limit spending at the state and 
federal levels.  It might, in short, move us closer to the period when 
city power was at its highest, before the reforms of the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth century. 
As Schragger explains, this framework threatens to supplant 
political governance with market forces.  As he states, “the increased 
power of large-scale, transnational capital has led some to question 
the regulatory capacities of the nation-state.  Decision-making 
appears to be migrating away from democratic institutions to global 
markets, leaving many to ask whether citizens have any role to play in 
the governance of their political communities.”57  For Schragger, city 
politics is the answer because it provides an “urban democracy that 
promotes individuals’ participation in economic and political life on 
terms of equality.”58 
Furthermore, as Schragger proposes, this new local framework 
should be adopted around the globe.  He states: 
Regulatory localism might be a feature of globalization—that is the 
optimistic story for those who worry about the loss of local 
democratic control. . . . In reasserting the public’s right and ability to 
control those large-scale corporate entities whose presence in the 
community is both a necessity and a threat, decentralized economic 
regulation suggests that city governance is still possible in an age of 
global capital flows.59 
                                                                                                                 
 57. SCHRAGGER, supra note 2, at 16. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 256. 
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Schragger correctly identifies the opportunities provided by a localist 
framework to knit cities across the globe to share best practices in 
inclusion and equitable development. 
CONCLUSION 
In order to establish such a framework, cities would need 
“unleashing,” as Schragger proposes.  Cities would need to have the 
clear authority to experiment without overreaching oversight from 
state governments.  Among the powers cities would need are the 
abilities to: (1) tax revenues in (almost) any manner they consider 
appropriate; (2) adopt inclusionary policies in housing, including rent 
controls if viewed as a potential solution to price escalation; (3) adopt 
not only minimum wage laws but other laws protecting workers’ 
rights; (4) favor their own residents over others in employment and 
service provision.  These are among the most contested areas of local 
government law, but the past few years have witnessed an increase in 
local adoption of a broader equity agenda.  To truly unleash cities 
would require pre-emptive restrictions on what state governments 
could do to overrule such experimentation, so that cities could 
develop a robust agenda without concern that courts or state 
legislatures could undo their efforts. 
To those who fear that unbridled state power might challenge 
fundamental rights, there are two retorts.  First, the United States 
Constitution and the limits it places on governmental actions that 
infringe upon individual rights would remain.  Second, if cities used 
this power inappropriately, the political “market” would still impose 
constraints.  People can, and do, move from local government to local 
government, as Tiebout and his followers have long argued.  If 
market efficiency can be trusted, then governments should take 
diverse approaches to governance and see which ones prevail.  
Because of the current political climate, and in light of the divisions 
elucidated by the 2016 United States presidential election, the time is 
right to begin such experiments in earnest. 
If such an effort really takes hold, it will have much credit to give to 
Richard Schragger’s contributions to our understanding of the past 
and potential future of city power.  By showing that law is contingent, 
and context-specific, Schragger makes available new possibilities for 
the organization of our society. 
 
